

VZCZCXRO0063
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHNH #0228/01 2891019
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161019Z OCT 06
FM AMCONSUL NAHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0633
INFO RHMFISS/18WG CP KADENA AB JA
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUSFNSG/CDR10THASG TORII STATION JA
RHMFISS/CDR1STBN1STSFGA TORII STATION JA
RHMFISS/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI
RHMFISS/CG FIRST MAW
RHMFISS/CG II MEF
RUHBABA/CG III MEF CAMP COURTNEY JA
RHMFISS/CG III MEF
RUHBABA/CG THIRD FSSG CAMP KINSER JA
RUHBABA/CG THIRD MARDIV CAMP COURTNEY JA
RUHBABA/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMFLEACT OKINAWA JA
RHMFISS/COMMARCORBASESJAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
RHMFISS/COMMARFORPAC
RHHMHAA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHOVVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT
RHHMDBA/COMSUBPAC PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RUHBVMA/CTF 76
RUYLBAH/DODSPECREP OKINAWA JA
RUESOK/FBIS OKINAWA JA
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 0203
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RHHMBRA/JICPAC PEARL HARBOR HI
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 0683
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/NAVCRIMINVSERVFO FAREAST YOKOSUKA JA
RHMFISS/NAVCRIMINVSERVRA OKINAWA JA
RUHBANB/OKINAWA AREA FLD OFC US FORCES JAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 0277
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 0239
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0632
RHMFISS/USARPAC G5 FT SHAFTER HI
RHMFISS/USPACOM REP GUAM ISLAND GU
RUALBCC/YOKOTA AB HQ USFJ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NAHA 000228

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2031

TAGS: [MARR](#) [PINS](#) [JA](#)

SUBJECT: PAC3 SUCCESSFULLY INTRODUCED TO OKINAWA

CLASSIFIED BY: Carmela A. Conroy, Acting Consul General, U.S.
Consulate General Naha, U.S. Department of State.

REASON: 1.4 (a), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: The introduction of the Patriot PAC-3 Air Defense Battalion into Okinawa is a success, with the locally (in Okinawa) most difficult part, the ground movement of sensitive equipment from port and pier to its destination within Kadena AFB, completed October 13. Despite some miscalculations of the tenacity of protestors blocking the gate to the ammunition pier, the GOJ rather quickly provided necessary support. For the second time this year, the GOJ and the Okinawa Prefectural Police physically removed protestors attempting to block progress towards implementing the alliance transformation and realignment initiatives contained in the October 29, 2005 report of the Security Consultative Committee ("2+2"). End

summary.

¶2. (U) Equipment for the 1-1 Air Defense Patriot PAC-3 battalion arrived in Okinawa on two separate ships, the first carrying supporting equipment and vehicles and the second carrying the more sensitive and visually distinct missiles, launchers and radar equipment. The first ship arrived Naha Military Port (NMP) slightly ahead of schedule on September 29. During the wee hours of October 2 through 5, convoys of those wheeled vehicles, trailers and containers drove from NMP to the Kadena Air Force Base (Kadena AFB).

¶3. (C) The two local daily newspapers gave blanket coverage to the notices of arrival and sought remarks from Okinawan officials, academics and anti-base organizations, repeatedly declaring that the arrival of the Patriot 3 (Pac3) battalion would generate strong opposition from the people of Okinawa. Okinawa Prefectural Police (OPP) and Okinawa Defense Facilities Administration Bureau (DFAB) reportedly told journalists that the Army had not requested assistance from the OPP in transporting equipment between facilities. (The 10 ASG and DFAB officials extensively discussed the planned movements on September 28 and 29. The Army command intended to reduce the visibility of the movements in order to minimize the amount of attention to them.) Despite intensive daily press coverage of the movements, anti-military protests were small, peaceful, and in no way impeded military operations from September 29 through completion of the transfer of the first shipment to Kadena AFB on October 5.

¶4. (C) Weather, and avoiding conflict with a major Naha City festival, resulted in postponing the arrival of the second ship carrying missiles and launchers from October 5 to October 9, a

NAHA 00000228 002 OF 004

Japanese and U.S. holiday. The missiles were to be off-loaded at Tengan Pier and transported to the Muns, just five km away. Note: This is the usual arrival point, ground transportation route, and storage point for U.S. military ammunition coming to Okinawa. End note. The ship was then to take the launchers and radar to NMP for onward transport by road to Kadena AFB. Coverage by the Okinawa daily newspapers of the details of the sea and land movements provided anti-base activists plenty of time to organize a protest outside Tengan Pier's sole gate, with smaller protests outside the NMP and Kadena AFB. Protestors stationed themselves outside Tengan Pier from October 5, and that same day the 10th Area Support Group (10thASG) requested support from the OPP through its liaison office to ensure egress on October 9.

¶5. (C) The morning of October 9 the protestors blocked all access to Tengan Pier with a sit-down demonstration. Despite the previous request from the 10th ASG, only two uniformed police officers were present at Tengan Pier. They took no apparent action to disperse the 50-60 protestors from the gate, and by 1030 the uniformed police officers left the site. The protestors erected tarps to protect themselves from the sun, plus loudspeakers, floodlights and generators. This ensured 20-25 media personnel could see and hear protestors as well as three requests by a DFAB official that they desist from blocking access to the facility.

¶6. (C) After the 10th ASG alerted ConGen Naha to the problem, we notified the Embassy and top officials of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA), DFAB and OPP. The GOJ officials asked for a written request from the 10th ASG commanding officer and/or Consul General Naha for police assistance with the transfer of the PAC3 missiles from Tengan Pier to the Kadena Munitions Area. Consul General Maher responded with a letter requesting DFAB and OPP assistance ensuring our Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) article 5 access to, and movement between, U.S. military facilities and areas.

¶7. (C) The commanding officer of the 10th ASG spent much of October 9 meeting with GOJ officials trying to accomplish the move that day. The 10th ASG, ConGen Naha, and DFAB all

pressured the OPP to gain access to Tengan Pier on October 9, but the OPP replied it could not act that day, since additional forces would have to be brought from the mainland. OPP said it could not undertake an operation to clear the gate without more planning and reinforcements. Late afternoon October 9, OPP agreed to ensure access and ensure safe movement of the missiles on October 11.

18. (C) On October 10 commanding officers of the 10th ASG, the 1-1 ADA, and 835th Transport Group, chief of the US Forces Japan

NAHA 00000228 003 OF 004

Okinawa Area Field Office, representatives of the (Navy) Commander Fleet Activities Okinawa and ConGen Pol-Mil Officer met with DFAB and OPP officials to plan security for the October 11 access to Tengan Pier and transportation of the missiles to the Muns, and October 13 access to and movement of the remaining equipment between the NPM and Kadena AFB. Once logistical details were set, the OPP requested an additional written request to cover the October 13 activities. OPP and DFAB said the situation in Okinawa was sensitive, and the Okinawan public would not understand the exercise of police power in support of the Pac 3 movements without a request from the USG.

19. (C) Pol-Mil Officer noted that the SOFA serves as a standing USG request for, and standing GOJ assurance of, access to and movement between military areas and facilities. Furthermore, there had been countless phone calls and at least six hours of bilateral meetings as evidence of the USG's specific requirements. OPP and DFAB assured USG participants that the Pac 3 deployment was a unique case, and the US side's providing a written request would not be cited as precedent for the GOJ demanding such formalities in the future. The OPP and DFAB also reluctantly agreed that, even if the USG did not provide the written request in this case, the SOFA and multiple bilateral communications sufficed to necessitate GOJ action in support of all remaining Pac 3 movements.

110. (U) Setting up before dawn October 11, the OPP and DFAB assisted the U.S. military in gaining access to Tengan Pier to off load the Patriot 3 (PAC3) missiles from the ship where they had been waiting since October 9. The appearance of approximately 100 riot police and 20 traffic police officers and a verbal warning convinced many protestors blocking the gate to depart. Thirty minutes later, the riot police firmly pushed the remaining 20-30 protestors away from the gate onto the sidewalk. Neither the police nor the protestors resorted to violence. The U.S. Army successfully unloaded the ship and transported all 24 containers of missiles to the Muns, with the OPP keeping protestors at bay and traffic controlled until the job was done.

111. (C) The ship, still carrying four missile launchers and several other pieces of equipment, continued to NMP on October 11. It was unloaded October 11 and all equipment placed in warehouses at NMP. The night of October 12, prior to the movement of the equipment to Kadena AFB, several DFAB officials stood by at NMP and OPP posted officers at every intersection along the route and at the gates of both facilities. The launchers were covered with tarps and the equipment broken into several small convoys and transported to Kadena AFB without incident early the morning of October 13. The Okinawa Times put the story on the front page of the October 13 morning edition

NAHA 00000228 004 OF 004

with a color photograph above the fold, but the Ryukyu Shimpo printed only a short, factual story with no photograph.

112. (C) Comment/Conclusion: The introduction of the Pac 3 Battalion into Okinawa is a success. When stories of the deployment began appearing in the local media in June, we anticipated extensive coverage and local opposition. The daily newspapers responded as expected, printing sometimes literally minute-by-minute accounts of vehicle movements, conducting

surveys, and printing all protests and anti-deployment activities that came their way. The July 4 ballistic missile launches and October 9 purported nuclear test by the DPRK, however, sapped the energy from Okinawan protests. Moderate, and even a few publicly immoderate anti-base reformists in private, admitted that there might be a valid reason for a ballistic missile defense system.

¶13. (C) Comment/Conclusion continued: That the DFAB and OPP did not anticipate, and better prepare to cope with, protestors blocking entry to Tengan Pier, appears to us to be more a case of internal miscommunication and lack of preparation than a political decision. Once the Okinawa-based GOJ offices were notified October 9 by the ConGen, they were quick to respond. Just 48 hours after the Army hoped to unload the ship at Tengan Pier, a professional and overwhelmingly large number of Japanese riot police and local traffic police deployed. They cleared the protestors and their equipment from the gates, allowing Army and Navy personnel and their contractors access to the pier, and rapid movement between Tengan Pier and the Kadena Munitions Area. The remaining movements were also fully supported by the OPP and DFAB. In sum, we assess that the deployment of police with respect to the PAC-3 movement, along with the deployment of police to remove protestors blocking access to Camp Schwab for the FRF cultural assets survey, indicates that the GOJ is serious and determined to implement our agreed transformation and realignment plans.

¶14. (U) The 10th ASG cleared this cable for content.
CONROY